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Abstract 
The theory of  knowledge in early twenrierh,century Anglo,American phi  .. 
losophy  was  oriented  wward phenomenally  described  cognition.  There 
was  a heal'hy respect for  ,he mind-body  p1"oblem,  which mean' ,ha, phe-
nomena  in  borh  the  mental  and  physical  domains  were  taken  serioU51y. 
Bertrand Russell's developing position on sense,dara aOO momentary par' 
ticulars  dTCW  upon,  and  ulrimately  became  like,  the  neutral  monism  of 
Ernst Mach and William James.  Due ro  a more recent behaviorist and 
physicalist inspired "fear of the mental",  this development has  been datcn .. 
l)layed in  historical work on early  analytic philosophy.  Such neglect as .. 
sumes t"hat  the "linguistic tum" is a proper and permanent effect of twen-
tieth  ..  cemury  philosophy,  an  assumption that disW1ts  early  analytic his-
toriography,  and begs a substantive philosophical question  about thought 
and cognilion. 
In early twentieth-century Britain and  America the once prevailing 
philosophical  idealism was  in retreat.  Pragmatism and various  re-
alisms  were  coming forth  to  take  its  place.  Debate and discussion 
focused partly on the notion of truth, and partly on the theory of 
knowledge. The latter topic is my interest here. Theories of knowl-
edge  in early  twentieth-century philosophy drew  some  inspiration 
from renewed discussion of  the classical empiricist writings of Berke-
ley and Hume. But they were also deeply candidoned by the prevail-
ing  theories of mind and  cognition found in the new experimental 
psychology in  Germany,  Britain,  and  America, and in  the scientific 
epistem.ologies of German natural scientists such as  Helmholtz and 
Mach. Both influences served to foster perception-based analyses of 
thought and cognition. 
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For  better or worse,  the many and varied works  in  the  theory 
of knowledge,  and their connection with scientific psychology and 
epistemology, have been underrepresented in recent work in the his  .. 
tory of early twentieth-century Anglo-American, or analytic, philos-
ophy.  Much of this  historical work has been aimed at the history 
of logic and the philosophy of language.  In this context,  the anti-
psychologism in logic of authors such as Frege and Husser! has been 
extended into the history of  philosophy (tself, causing the many pos-
itive relations between philosophy and psychology in this period, not 
only in Germany but also in Britain and American, to be largely ig-
nored. Dummett (1993), for instance, treats perception-based analy-
ses of  thought as something that had to be overcome in the course of 
the "linguistic turn", a turn that he (incredibly) dates to the late nine  .. 
teenth century. Dummett (1993, p. Viii)  leaves the work of  Bettrand 
Russell and G. E. Moore out of his account of the origins of analytic 
philosophy.  Theories of sense-data and of the place of perception 
in thought and knowledge have received less attention than would 
be warranted by  the extensive role  they played in early twentieth-
century Anglo-American philosophy itself. 
The interplay among the theory of knowledge, experimental psy-
chology,  and scientific epistemology is  represented in the changing 
philosophical positions of Bertrand Russell, and his adoption of the 
neutral monism of William James and the American Neo-Realists.l 
Russell's own thought--as that oflames and his sources within scien-
tific psychology--expressed a major concern of  the time: the relation 
between mind and body,  Of, as it was often put, between mental and 
physical phenomena.  This relation was widely discussed in experi-
mental psychology and in theories of knowledge.  Russell's concern 
with this topic is evident both before and after his  turn to neutral 
monism in 1918.  Although the many authors who addressed this 
relarion did not agree on the ontology of mind and body,  there was 
wide agreement that mental and physical phenomena must both be 
taken seriously. And the paradigm instance of  a mental phenomenon 
was considered to be immediate conscious experience itself, in its full 
phenomenaliry.  It is,  I think, precisely because Russell, James, and 
others took the phenomenal mind so seriously that aspects of their 
work has been avoided in recent histories of  Anglo~Anlerican, or an~ Sense~Data and the Philosophy of Mind:  Russell, James, and Mach  205 
alytic, philosophy at the tum of the century.  This avoidance of the 
mind-body problem is itself characteristic of a mid to late twentieth-
century tendency to deny the mental, a tendency I will take up in the 
concluding section. 
1. Russell's Tum to Neutral Monism 
The fact that Russell's views on the analysis of consciousness or  per~ 
ceptual awareness underwent significant change in 1918 ought to be 
well known, for Russell himself announced and described his change 
of mind in several places. The first public notice was given in a paper 
from 1919, entitled "On Propositions", read before the Aristotelian 
society and published the same year. Later, in My Philosophical Devel-
opment, he described this change as follows: 
During 1918 my view as  to mental events underwent a very impor~ 
tant change.  I had originally accepted Brentano's view that in sen, 
sarion there are three elements: act, content and object. I had come 
to think that the distinction of content and object is  unnecessary, 
but 1 still thought that sensation is  a fundamentally relational  oc~ 
currence in which a subject is  "aware" of an object.  I had used the 
concept "awareness" or "acquaintance" to express this relation of 
subject and object, and had regarded it as fundamental in the theory 
of empirical knowledge, but I became gradually more doubtful as to 
this relational character of mental occurrences.  In my  lectures on 
logical Atomism I expressed this doubt, but soon after I gave these 
lectures I became convinced that William James had been right in 
denying the relational character ofsensatiofiS.  [1959, p.  134] 
Russell  here  describes  three  positions  he  held  over  a  period  of 
less than tcn years:  his original position (here ascribed to Brentano, 
elsewhere to Meinong), which distinguished among mental act, sub~ 
jective content (sense-datum), and objcct (external physical thing); 
a subsequent pnsition,  beld from  1914  to 1918,  which still  distin-
guished  between subject and object;  and  the  position he  newly 
adopted in 1918, which denied a separate subject. 
Concerning the  intenllcdiate  view  he  held  prior  to  accepting 
James' position, he says in the quotation that he .tthought that sen~ 
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'aware' of an object",  He expressed this position in his papers "The 
Relation of  Sense-Data to Physics" (1914b) and "The Ultimate Con-
stituents of Matter"  (1915),  and in a paper in which he  rejected 
James'  theory,  "On the Nature of Acquaintance" (1914a).  In this 
context, when speaking of the "relational" nature of sensation Rus  .. 
sell did not have in mind relati.ons  among sensations, but rather  a 
fundamental relation that he held occurs in all acts of  sensation: the 
relation between the subject, who is aware of the sensation, and the 
sensation itself, which is the object of  that awareness.  It is the neces  .. 
sity of positing a relation between a distinct subject and the objects 
of thought that James had challenged, and that Russell himself sub-
sequently came to reject. 
We can elaborate Russell's position in 1914 more fully by consider-
ing his criticism of  James expressed in that year. The discussion took 
place in a context in which Russell  was considering various relations 
that might obtain between the physical and the mental.  (During this 
time he sometimes advocated dualism, as in Russell,  1915; at other 
times he was agnostic about the mind-body relation, as  in Russell 
1914a/1956, pp.  164-5.)  In this context, he endeavored to distin-
guish his own posltion both from an idealism which reduces the phys. 
ical to the mental, and from the neutral monism which denies any 
fundamental ontological distinction between mental acts and their 
objects, hence between the physical and the mental. He found that 
he was now in agreement with (he neutral monists, against the ideal  ... 
ists, that the mind is not subject to a veil of  perception, according to 
which it would know the external world only through the medium of 
"ideas". But he disagreed with them on other points: 
I do not think that, when an object is known to me, there is in my 
mind something which may  be  called an  "idea" of the object,  the 
possession of which constitutes my  knowledge  of the object.  But 
when this is granted, neutral monism by  no means follows.  On the 
contrary,  it is  just at this point that neutral monism finds  itself in 
agreement with idealism in making an assumption which I believe 
to be wholly false.  The assumption is  that, if anything is immediately 
present  to  me,  that thing muse  be part of my  mind.  The upholders  of 
"ideas", since they believe in the duaHty ofrhe mental and physicaL 
tnfer from this assumption that only ideas. not physlcal things, can be Sense·Data and the Philosophy of  Mind:  Russell, James, and Mach 
immediately present to me.  Neutral monists, perceiving (rightly,  as 
I think) that constituents of the physical world can be immediately 
present to  me, infer that the mental and the physical are composed 
of the same  "stuff',  and are  merely  different arrangements of the 
same elements.  But if the assumption is false,  bam these opposing 
theories may befalse, as! believe they are.  [1914a/1956,  p.  147) 
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The upholder of ideas in this case is  a  representational realist, who 
maintains that we know physical things through the intennediary of 
ideas that are "part of" the mind.  Russell himself espoused such a 
view in his earlier Problems of Philosophy  (1912, chs. 1-3), in which 
he considered sense~data to be private objects of perception.  Now 
in 1914 Russell agrees with the neutral monist in rejecting that posi. 
tion. He agrees with the neutral monist that "physical things" may be 
"inm1ediately present" in perception-though Care must be taken in 
interpreting what Russell meant by "physical things" in this period, in 
which he had rejected representationa1 realism. Russell distinguishes 
himself from the neutral monist, by attributing to the neutral monist 
the view that whatever is "immediately present" in perception is "part 
of" the mind. He in effect accused the neutral monist of reducing the 
physical to the mental. Since Russell's neutral monist is represented 
primarily by James,  Russell here accused James of a kind of Berke-
leyan idealism. And in met, many years later, in his History of  Western 
Philosophy,  Russell alleged that James had not developed a genuine 
neutral monism, which would abolish the division between physical 
and mental, but that his position conveyed a latent Berkeleyan ide~ 
alism (1945, p. 813). 
In hi.s intcnnediate posi.tion,  Russell held that the things imme-
diately present to mind as  physical objects are sense-data  (l914b, 
1915).  By  usense~data'\ he now  meant "momentary particulars" 
(1915/1963, p. 102; 1918/1956, pp. 201-2), which possess properties 
such as shape and color. These pa.rticulars are modeled on perceptual 
experience, in that they are like perspective images of what we  our~ 
selves might call "ordinary objects" (which Russell now considered to 
be constructions from these particulars) seen from a particular point 
of view.  Sense~data are momentary particulars because they exist as 
sensory data only while we are perceiving them. They have the prop-
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characterized color and shape, as opposed to the properties posited 
by physics, such as  sub~visible, rapidly moving waves, or sub~visible 
structures of  particles. As now theorized by RusseII, these sense~data 
are not themselves perceptions; they are not themselves sensations or 
awarenesses, but are the objects of  perception. They are not mental. 
Nor are these sense~data uthird things" lying between subject and ob~ 
jeee; rather,  they are instances of what Russell now terms Uphysical" 
things themselves.  To allow for the continuity of "physical" objects 
beyond perception, Russell posited unperceived momentary particll~ 
lars (which, because unperceived, cannot be called "data"), which he 
called sensibilia.  Physical objects as  conceived by the physicist  (as 
collections of particles in motion) he regarded as fictions, or as logi. 
cal constructions. During this period Russell rejected the "ordinary" 
physical objects of representational realism.  But he still agreed with 
the representational realist  (and the idealist,  for  that matter)  that 
mental acts are  distinct from  their objects.  His  subsequent tum to 
neutral monism marked a denial of a separate subject, and a rejec# 
tion of the distinction between menta] act and object. 
When Russell became a neutral monist he also  came to  reject 
sense· data (1919/1956, p. 306;  1921, pp. 141-2; 1959, p. 135). Care 
must be taken in interpreting d1is change.  In rejecting sense#data, 
he  did not reject sequences of momentary particulars.  Rather,  he 
came co  reject the distinction between such particulars and a sub# 
JCCt who senses them. The particulars were no longer to be regarded 
as "data" for a subject, because the  subject itself was denied.  Or,  to 
put it another way,  the experience had by a certain subject is  now 
regarded simply as  a spedfic sequence from  among the various  5e# 
quences of momentary  particulars  that  constitute everything,  and 
which are the only particulars whose existence is explicitly allowed. 
(As we shall see, Russell did nOt flatly deny that the subject exists. but 
he took the theoretical attitude that its existence was not needed and 
should not be posited.) Russell's immediate particulars are now to be 
equated with the "elements" of  James and Mach (as noted in Russell, 
1919/1956, p. 305; 1914a/1956, p.  140). 
In his  1919 article "On Propositions", in which he ultimately af· 
firmed his agreement with James, Russell provided yet another guide 
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change of positi.on,  he described various philnsophical positions  to~ 
ward uideasn or upresentations": 
We have here a great variety of theories urged by different authors. 
Many  analytic  psychologists-Meinong,  for  example--distinguish 
three elements in  a presentation, namely,  the act (or subject), the 
content, and the object. Realists such as Dr. Moore and myself have 
been in the habit of rejecting the content, while retaining the act 
and the object. American realists, on the other hand, have rejected 
both the act and the content, and have kept only the object; while 
idealists, in effect if not in words, have rejected the object and kept 
the content. [1919/1956, p. 305] 
Russell  now  describes  his  intermediate position  (of 1914-18)  as 
a  form of realism,  which he contrasts with idealism and with the 
''American realism" of  James and others, as well as with his own pre~ 
vi.ous position (now compared to Meinong's positi.on).  All of these 
contrasts are characterized as ways of  thinking about upresentations", 
that is, about perceptual presentations or mental contents (contents 
of  consciousness, taken more broadly than the Meinongian notion of 
"content" in the quotation). These contrasts require a bit of  unpack~ 
ing. 
ln the quotation Russell refers first  to  the position of Uanalytic 
psychology", which distinguishes act, content, and object. The "act" 
here  is  the act of perception by  a  subject,  and is  glossed as such. 
Thc distinction between content and object, which goes unexplained 
here, was motivated by a variety of  concerns about capturing both the 
content and subjectivity of thought.  ln his discussion of Meinong's 
distinction in 1914. Russell focused largely on its use to explain how 
actually  existing  thoughts can have  non~existent objects  as  their 
Meinongian content (1914a/1956,  pp.  170-3).  Previously,  in "On 
Denon.ng" (1905), Russell had offered his own analysis of thoughts 
about non  .. existent objects, which did not require a special "content" 
presenting such objects to the mind; discussion of such objects was 
mediated by descripti.ons that did not directly name a  non~existent 
object. 
A  further motivation for distinguishing subjective content from 
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mental presentation (1914a(1956, p.  173).  Prior to adopting his in-
termediate position in 1914, Russell himself had been a representa-
tional realist who distinguished between phenomenal color as found 
in  sense-data  and  the  physical  color  properties  that  cause  those 
sense-data by reflecting light waves of a certain sort (Russell,  1912, 
ch.3).  In the terms attributed to Meinong in the quotation above, 
the subjective content of  perception was sometimes called the "mode 
of presentation", and sometimes simply the Ucontent" of the presen-
tation. A description of Russell's 1912 position in these terms would 
distinguish subjectively experi.enced color; as content or mode of  pre-
sentation, from physical color.  But in  the period from  1914-1918 
Russell rejected the kind of independently exisring physical object 
posited by  the representational tealist, and identified the object of 
perception with momentary particulars.  111ese momentary parti.cu-
lars  (sense-data and sensibilia)  could be both shaped and colored, 
and also reflected a "point of view".  Russell thetelore noW  had nO 
need to distinguish mental content from object properties, since he 
identified the object wit h tbe momentary particulars present in per-
ception.  He could therefore do away with a separate Meinongian 
content, and be left with just the object. But it must be emphasized 
that  "object"  in  this  context does not mean the ordinary  physical 
objects of a representational realist or  of a more recent physicalist 
realist.  In 1914-18 (and after)  Russell conceived of those sorts of 
objects as constructions from  the momentary particulars that stand 
as objects of  perception in the Moore~  Russell account mentioned in 
the quotation. 
The review of positions further describes "idealists" and  '~meri  .... 
can realists". The first are not the "upholders of ideas" from the 1914 
paper (who wete representational tealists).  They are genuine ideal-
ists, who, by  denying the object and affirming the content, reduce 
everything to minds and their states (since content is  a state of the 
subject). The American reali.sts, by contrast, JJhave kept only the ob  .. 
jeer".  This again does not mean that they have kept what we have 
been calling ordinary physical objects;  rather,  they have kept pre-
sentations, or objects of perception (which Russell called momentary 
particulars, and James and Mach called elements), now no longer 
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denied. From a naive physicalist perspective, or a position of realism 
about "ordinary" physical objects, the alleged realism of Russell  and 
[he Americans is very odd, since their partLculars and elements are 
modeled on perceptual states. But they both insisted on their realism 
because they insisted that their particulars and elements are not to be 
conceived as  states of mind, or as states apprehended hy  CI  knowing 
subject.  Rather,  the notion of knowing subject must be interpreted 
by stringing together multitudes of  elemencs, in the same way as or~ 
dinary physical objects have been reinterpreted as sequences of mo· 
mentary particulars. Thus, their positions allow neither for the view 
that all reality is  reduced to states of a subject, nor for the view that 
reality somehow lies beyond the  elemerus or  particulars of  percep~ 
cion.  Reality is taken to be the sequences of momentary  particulars 
t hcmse lves. 
Having laid out these various positions, Russett  immediately  de~ 
e1ares tbat he has thrown in with the American realists. The grounds 
for his conversion, he makes  clear, are empirical and epistcmic.  In~ 
deed, he seems to have adopted a pDsition quite dose to jc.\mes' radi# 
cal empiricism: 
I have to confess that the theory which analyses a presentarion into 
;:I.ct and object no longer satisfies me. 111e act, Or subject, is sc hemat~ 
ically convenient, but not empirically discoverable. It seems to serve 
the same sort of purpose as is served oy points anti instams, by nllm# 
bers and particles and the rest of the apparatlls of  ntathematks. All 
these things have to be  constructed,  not postulated:  they are not of 
the stuff of the world, but assemblages which  it is  convenient to be 
able  to designate as  if they were single  things.  The same seems  to 
be true of the subject, and I run at a loss to discover any actual phe~ 
nomenon which could be called an "act" and could  be  regarded as 
a constituent of a presentation.  The logical analogies  which  have 
led me to this conclusion have been reinforced by the arguments of 
James and the America" realists.  [1919(1956, p. 3051 
Russell describes his change of  pusition as  an extension to the know# 
ing subject of his previous constructivist view toward ordinary objects 
(as  in Russell,  1914b,  1915).  Having, in the earlier papers,  treated 
the entities normally posited by  a certain type of realist  in t~rpreta~ 
tion of physical theory as logical constructions out of  sense~ data, he 212  Gary Hatfield 
now says that the subject itself is another such construction. As will 
become clear, the subject is constructed by following out sequences of 
momentary particulars from the theoretical point of  view of  psychol-
ogy, while physical objects are constructed by following out sequences 
of momentary particulars from a physical point of  view. 
In the quotation Russell appeals to epistemic grounds, and specif-
ically to a lack of empirical evidence for a separate subject,  in jus· 
tifYing its rejection.  These are si.mliar grounds to  hl.s objections to 
"ordinary" physical objecrs:  they would be unknowably locked away 
behind a veil of perception.  Now in fact,  just as  he did not deny 
outright that such "ordinary" physical objects exist, he also did not 
assert outright that subjects do not exist. As he put it: 
Not that it is  certain that there is no such thing as  a "subject", any 
more than it is certain that there are no points and instants.  Such 
things may exist,  but we have no reason to suppose they do,  and 
therefore our theories  ought to avoid  assuming either that they do 
exist or that they d<..)  not exist. The praccical effect of this i.s the same 
as if we assumed that they did not exist, but the theorerical attitude 
is different.  [1919(1956, p. 305) 
Presumably, we have no reason to posit either physical points or expe  .. 
riencing subjects because we lack direct empirical evidence for them. 
Nor going beyond the evidence, we arc left only with momentary par-
ticulan;, modeled on perceptions but not to be equated with objects 
of  perception for a knowing subject. since we are not pOsiting the ex  .. 
i.stcncc of knowing subjects, but arc recognizing only the particulars 
themselves. 
In addressing the  need to posit a subject, Russell  was engaging 
a long-standing problem in modern philosophy, dating back to Des-
cartes, but also posed prior to modem philosophy in discllssions of 
Aristotle's De anima.  The problem arises  from  disagreement over 
whether we have any direct apprehension of rhe subject itself.  In 
Descartes' philosophy,  the question was posed as one of whether we 
have immediate acquaintance with mental substance as the substrate 
of thought.  Some later philosophers have interpreted Descartes as 
holding that through the cogico we directly apprehend a simple, think-
ing substance, whereas others find  that the cogiro is only one step in Sense,Dara and the Philosoph, ofMilld:  Rl~sell, James, and Mach  213 
an argument to the conclusion that the subject is a simpte substance 
(see  Hatfield,  2003).  Be  that as  it may.  by  the time of Hume and 
Kant the foclls  of discussion  had  shifted  somewhat.  It concerned 
not only the question of a direct apprehension of a simple substance 
(which both Hume and Kant denied), but also the question about 
whether there is  awareness of mental acts,  beyond awareness of the 
objects of thought.  Hume (1739--40), who spoke freely of the sub-
ject Hnoticing"  things or "attending" to them, nonetheless seems to 
have ruled out any direct aW'dreness of  mental acts, since he admic(ed 
awareness merdy of bare.  picture~like impressions  and  ideas.  Kant 
allowed coruciousness of the synthesizing activity of the subject itself, 
but no knowledge of  that activity in itself (1787/1998, BI87-8, B41lt1, 
B422n). Debate over this issue continued throughout the nineteenth 
century,  and the topic was  much discussed in late  nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuty experimental psychology.  It was part of the 
imageless thought controversy (on which, scc Kusch,  1999, chs.  l-
2).  It was  now straightforwardly an empirical and epistemic ques-
tion: Do we have any direct apprehension of the act of  perception or 
thought, as  opposed to being aware simply of the objects of percep. 
tion or thought? 
Mach and James, and later Russell, found no direct eVidence for 
the "act". Recall how Russell  put this point in the quotation: "The 
act, or subject, is ... not empirically discoverable"; and further:  "I am 
at a loss to discover any actual phenomenon which could be called 
an 'act' and could be regarded as a constituent of  a p[esentation". An 
example may help [0 clarify this empirical claim. Suppose I am think· 
ing of a ca t.  Let's say tha t my image of the ca t is  my object. Suppose 
I picture the cat as tYing on its back with its four paws dangling out, 
showing a whitish underbelly streaked with the stripes of an orange 
tabby.  Beyond merely being aware of this image,  I may at  (he same 
time be wanting to buy the cat, or missing the cat, or feeling affection 
for the cat. Brentano (1874/1973, pp. 79-80) regarded these various 
attitudes toward the object of thought as so many psychological acts 
taken toward the presentation, Russell's idea is that each of these a}· 
leged "acts" is just a feeling. that is, another presentation experienced 
along with the image of the cat. and that there is no direct apprehen, 
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a subject or a mind lying beyond or behind the presentations or mo· 
mentary particulars and performing these acts, for there is  no hard 
evidence for acts apart from presentations or momentary particulars. 
The notion of  the subject then becomes a logical construction out of 
momentary particulars. You as a subject are to be identified with the 
sequence of momentary particulars that constitute your moment to 
moment states of  consciousness, and I am to be equated with another 
sequence, and so on. 
The position of neutral monism,  according to which individual 
minds and bodies are logical constructions from momentary particu~ 
lars, has a certain oddness about it for us now.  Normally, we think of 
objects as  fundamental and of  experiences of  objects, or momentary 
particulars modeled on experiences of objects,  as  secondary.  Thus, 
we might think of wood,  metal,  and varnish as  the materials from 
which We  construct a  table,  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  and  nitro~ 
gen as  the constituents of those materials,  protons,  electrons,  and 
neutrorul as  making up  those elements, and on down to quarks or 
whatever is  basic.  But in Russell's temlS, tables are logical construc~ 
tions out of momentary particulars, and it now seems odd to think of 
phenomenally conceived color and phenomenally conceived shape 
as more basic than tables, chairs, and human bodies.  Yet that is the 
position of Russell, James, and Mach. Some insight into how such a 
position arose can be gleaned by follOWing its origin back to Russell's 
predecessors.  Russell himself has already given us  a hint about the 
leading motivation for  the position.  The position seeks to admit as 
real only what is  empirically well attested, and it finds  that only the 
"elements" of  experience pass this test. 
2. James' Radical Empiricism 
The epistemic basis of the position had previously been articulated by 
James. In his Principles ofPsyclwlngy  (1890, ch. !O), he had expressed 
reservations about whether psychology, as a natural SCience,  needed 
to posit a subject. He concluded it did not. No thinking subject, or 
thinker, is needed. As he put it in his famous conclusion to Chapter 
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no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself 
the thinker" (1890, 1:401). 
This quotation concluded a discussion of  whether a transcenden~ 
tal ego is  required in the analysis of thought.  One reaSon given for 
positing an ego had been to explain hawaII individual thoughts can 
be the thoughts of one and the same thinker.  James argued that in 
order to explain this  uniey of consciousness, we need only posit the 
various thoughts themselves, occurring in a sequence in which each 
thought inherits ownership of  the previous thoughts. Empirically, this 
ownership comes dO\vIl  to a feeling directed toward prior thoughts. 
Such a feeling is  a component of each sllccessive thought in the  se~ 
quence. The role of  the thinker as owner of  thoughts is thus reduced 
to an aspect of individual thoughts: the feeling of ownership of  pre-
vious thoughts. 
When James  published the essay "Does Consciousness Exist" in 
1904, he went beyond merely questioning the  empirical need for  a 
thinker in scientific psychology, and advanced the philosophical the-
sis that the thinker is  a fiction.  In the essay he first stated this point 
as a result of the supposition that there are  not two "stuffs"  in the 
world (mind and matter), but only one: 
My  thesis  is  that if we  start with the supposition that  there  is  only 
one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything 
is composed, and if we call that stuff "pure experience"  t  then know~ 
ing can easily be explained as a particular sort of  relation towards one 
another into which portions of pure experience may enter, The rela~ 
don itself is part of pure experience; one of its  "terms" becomes the 
subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower,  the other becomes 
the object known.  [1904a/1996, p. 41 
The stuff of "pure experience" is  the momentary particulars of  Rus~ 
sell. There is no knower or subject. James' position may indeed better 
account for  the phenomenology of thought ownership than would 
Russell's,  through the feeling individual thoughts have of grasping, 
knowing, and being related to other thoughts.  But he no more pos-
ited a substantial subject (han did Russell. For both  James and Russell 
the thoughts themselves constitute the thinker. 
James did not hold this position merely as a supposition.  He re-
garded it as  a consequence of a radical empiricism.  In  his  essay  I~ 216  Gary HarfieiJ. 
World of Pure Experience" (1904b), he wrote: 
To  be  radical,  an empiricism must neither admit into its  construc~ 
tions any element that is  not directly experienced, nor exclude from 
them any element that is  directly experienced.  For such a  philoso~ 
phy, the relations that connect eXperieI1CeS must themselves be ex~ 
perienced relations,  and any kind of relation experienced must be 
accounted as  "'real" as  anything else in  the system.  Elements may 
indeed be  redistributed,  the original placing of things getting  cor~ 
reeted, but a real place must be found for every kind of  thing experi~ 
-enced. whether tenn or relatioo, in the fin31 philosophical anange~ 
ment. [1904b/1996, p. 421 
The J'elenlents
lJ  here mentioned are  instances of the "one primal 
stuff' of the previous quotation. They are elements modeled on per-
ceptions and  theorized as  intrinsically  neithet mental nor physical, 
but as  neutral elements that constitute the phenomena of both do-
mains (1904a/1996, pp. 11-5). 
These elements are able to account for both mental and physi-
cal phenomena by being regarded  in various sequences, some con-
stituting physical processes, some psychological. If  I am looking at a 
candle, I can regard the candle as  a light source and consider a se-
quence of thoughts that include the effect of light-energy upon the 
retina and subsequent neural stimulation (see James,  1890,  1:25). 
This is  the physical sequence.  Or I may consider my initial experi-
ence of the candle as pan of a sequence of thoughts, some of whic:h 
are the same as the thoughts in the physical sequence, and some of 
which are different.  Thus, seeing the candle, ] may be reminded of 
a  candle I once saw in Rio, and then begin to daydream about my 
trip to Brazil, and imagine the beautiful setting in Florian6polis. This 
sequence of elements falls  under psychological laws, and of course 
includes the very same  thoughts about the physical process of the 
candle which are i.nterspetsed among, or interrupted by, my reveries 
about BraziL  But even if there were no reveries, the very sequence of 
thoughts about the candle could be viewed as both a psychological 
and a physical sequence, depending on how it was further connected 
with other thought elements. There is  no difference in kind among 
the elements themselves, only a difference in how they are regarded 
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Russell summed up this part of James' position pretty well in the 
1919 paper "On Propositi  OilS": 
William James,  in  his  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  developed  the 
view thar rhe mental and the physical are not distinguished by the 
stuff  of  which they are made. but only by their causal laws. Tltis view 
is very attractive, and I have made great endeavours to believe it.  I 
thlnk lames is  right in making the distinction between the causal 
laws  the essential  thing.  There  do  seem  to be  psychological  and 
physical laws  which  are distinct from  each other.  \'(Ie may define 
p~yehology as  the study of the one SOrt of laws,  and physics as the 
study of the other.  But when  we  come to consider the stuff of the 
twO  sciences,  it would seem that there are some particulars which 
obey only ph},sicallaw5 (namdy, unperceived material things), some 
which obey only psychologi<.:allaws  (namely,  images,  at least), and 
some  which obey both  (namely,  sensations).  Thus sensations  will 
be lxnh physical  and mental,  while  images  will  be  purely menta1. 
[1919/1956, p.  299J 
The last part of the summary is suspect, since James was one to em  .. 
phasize the material conditions (i.e.,  corresponding brain states) for 
all psychological states, and so also fot images (1890, ch. 18). Russell 
was less Willing to venture into di~cussjon of brain processes.  Oth· 
ern.'ise,  the description of two sets of laws captures James' position. 
The  notion of  ~ Iaw" mighr admit further investigation, but for  now 
we can regard such laws as well. confirmed empirical generalizations. 
The "unperceived material things" correspond to what Russell earlier 
called "sensibilia".  The neutral monisms of Russell and James were 
indeed quire similar,  and both appealed to a  radical empiricism in 
support of  their positions.2 
3. Machian Elements and German Positivism 
In his initial discussion of neutral monism, Russell invoked the name 
of Mach as well as James (Russell, 1914a/1956,pp. 127,140).3 Mach 
had developed a similar position in his Science  of Mechanics  (1883/ 
1960, pp. 579, 610- 2). which he stated more fully in his Contributions 
to the Analysis of Sensations  (1886).  Mach often presented the posi. 
tion as a bald ontological thesis, as when he said "TIle assertion, then. 218  Gary Harfield 
is correct that the world consists only of  our sensations" (1886/1897, 
p.  10). But it seems clear that the spirit in which he presented it was 
not as  someone who reduced the world  to mental entities!  that is, 
to sensations, but as someone who adopted an austere  epistemologi~ 
c.al modesty according to which only sensations, or sensory contents) 
are known (see Cohen, 1970).  His position would then be read as 
a claim that all that can be known, and hence all  that science can 
investigate, arC  sequences of the basic elements of experience.  We 
have seen that Russell, too, when he was being careful, characterized 
his  own monism as  an attitude toward what should be accepted as 
real based on what is known, as opposed to a dogmatic assertion that 
the mind as  the subject of melltal acts,  and bodies as  conceived by 
physics, do not exist. 
In the Analysis of Sensations  Mach presented the position as one 
to which the scientist is drh"en by a careful attention to what is really 
known: 
As soon as we have perceived that the supposed unities "body" and 
"ego"  are  only  makeshifts,  designed for  provis!onal survey  and  for 
certain practical ends  (so that we may take  hold of bodies, protect 
ourselves  against  pain,  and  so forth),  we  find  ourselves  obliged,  in 
many profound scientific investigations, to abandon rhem 3S insuffi-
cient and inappropriate.  The antithesis of ego and world, sensation 
(phenomenon) and thing, then vanishes, and we have simply to deal 
with the connexion of the elements a f3  y ... ABC  ... K L M ... , of 
which this antithesis was only a partially appropriate and imperfect 
expression. This connexion is nothing more nor less than the cornbi-
nation of the above-mentioned elements with other similar dements 
(time and space).  Science has simply to accept this  connexion, and 
to set itself aright  (get its  bearings)  in the  intellectual environment 
which is  thereby furnished,  without attempting to explain its  exis-
tence. [1886(1897, p. 11] 
The various sequences or complexes of  elements mentioned here are 
sequences of elements into which Mach has resolved the phenom-
enal content of experience.  The elements ABC are  the "colors, 
sounds, and so forth, commonly called bodies"; the elements K L M 
constitute "the complex, known as our body") which is a part of  total 
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f3  yare "volitions,  memory~imagcs, and  the rest",  that is,  they are 
the remaining contents of experience, which are  not taken as  per~ 
ceptions of external objects (1886/1897, p.  10).  Mach was not here 
positing an analysis down to bare punctiform sensations of quality, 
as  had other radical empiricists  (such as  Helmholtz,  1878),  for  he, 
as James and Russell  would later, held that both spatial and tempo-
ral  structure are found  in  the elements of  sensation and perception 
(1886/1897, p. 8). 
In this analysis, bodies and the ego are  "makeshifts" framed  out 
of the elements of experience, as  a result of regular co,occurrences 
among them.  Thus, we  find  in  e>.-perience  a regularly  cO~t.lCcllrring 
complex of  visual appearances with a characteristic shape, some feel, 
ings of tactual sensations. and so on, which we take to be our arms 
and legs; we associate these with other internal sensations, with im, 
ages we see in the mirror, and so on, to produce the "supposed unity" 
we  call "our body".  As Mach (1886/1897,  pp. 15-7) observed,  we 
are virtually always aware of  our body if for no other reason than be, 
cause of the appearance of the side of our nose in the visual field. We 
may also note special consequences when the sequence of clements 
which includes what we call our hand is  brought very near to what 
we call fire.  for a new element arises, that is, pain. Bur, Mach thinks. 
if  we  pay careful ancnrion to what we actually find among Our e>..-pe, 
riences, we will arrive only at the spatially and temporally articulated 
elements he calls .sensations. 
Positions si.milar to Mach's were prevalent in late nineteenth ~cen~ 
tury German thought, and could be found in merhodological fOrm in 
psychological writings  in both Germany and America.  In standard 
historical accounts of the  philosophy of this period  (e.g.,  Falcken. 
berg,  1893, pp. 618-9; see  also Perry,  1925,  pp' 507-9), a position 
similar to that of Mach and later James was ascribed to the uGenuan 
positivists", including Emil Laas, Alois Riehl, and Richard Avenarius. 
Laas (1879-84, bk. 1, sec. 22) and Avenarius (1888-90, citing Mach 
and Laas) especially focused on facts of perception as the basis of all 
knowledge, and saw subject and object as interdefinable only in terms 
of these facts.  The SCientific philosopher Hermann Helmholtz also 
analyzed all knowledge into sensational elements (though he, unlike 
Mach. did not i.nclude space an:'lOng  the elements. bur regarded spa, 220  Cary H.rjieiJ 
tial experience as  constructed, on which see Hatilcld, 1990, ch. 5). 
For  him,  as  well  as  Mach and James,  knowledge  is  to be sought 
in the lawful relations among sensations Or perceptions (Helmholz, 
1878).  Mach, Helmholtz, and the German positivists all shared an 
impatience with what they ca\led "metaphysics", including the meta-
physics of materialism. They agreed ill denying both the "spiritualist" 
hypothesis that minds arc real entities apart from matter, and the ma-
terialist hypothesis  that mind is  really matter (see, e.g., Helmholtz, 
1867/1924-25,3:532). They sought to articulate a view of the world 
that stayed close to the evidence.  Thus, sensations or perceptions 
would be admitted, regularities among them would be charted, and 
laws stating these empirical regularities would be accepted.  But the 
positing of entities underlying perceptions and their laws-whether 
these entities be minds or bodies-was to be avoided, as unnecessary 
and ungrounded. 
4. Motivation and Fate of Neutral Monism 
Viewed from a  presenc~day commonsense perspective, nelltral mon  ... 
ism is  a crazy  position.  It tells  us  that lxxlies are to be  viewed  as 
constructions out of momentary particulars, or out of  the elements of 
perception. It  forbids us from treating bodies as independently exist-
ing unities; rather, only momentary particulars are to be regarded as 
(per haps) haVing independent existence beyond the actual sequence 
of our own perceptual states. Commonsensically,  we think that bod-
ies do eXist, that they are made of compounds of the various chemi-
cal elements in the periodic table, and that these elements are com-
posed of subatomic particles that can be  isolated and manipulated 
by physical means.  Mach's  (1883/1960,  pp. 579-90) refusal to posit 
molecules and atoms has not retained its intellectual attraction. 
How then, did this apparently crazy position come to be accepted 
by  the likes of Mach, James,  and Russell!  The explicit motivation 
arose from  a desire  to be true to empiricism,  and  so  to avoid  mak~ 
ing posits that moved unnecessarily beyond the data of perception. 
Mach, James, and Russell all offered a jllstification of  this sort. How-
ever,  this justification cannot by  itself explain why they would dis-Seme-Daw and !he Pllilosophy of Mind:  Russell, James,  and Mach  221 
pense with both ego and mind-independent physical things in favor 
of perceptually-characterized momentary particulars. To understand 
that, we must understand why they began with perception as the ba-
sis of knowledge.  And to understand how their position can'e to be 
so rhoroughly rejected by the latter half of the twentieth century, we 
will need to trace the fate of their beginning a~sUlnptions. 
When Mach, James,  and Russell  were writing,  the base-line as-
sumptions about the character of thought and cognition were quite 
different from those that became prominent in subsequent decades. 
In particular,  these authors all  were continuing an cl'npiricist the-
ory of cognition that  had been expressed in Hume and ).  S.  Mill, 
and tbat shared certain beginning assumptions with Kant and even 
Hegel. A common assumption held by all these authors was that per-
ception is  the primary medium of cognition.  In this context. while 
language might be viewed as  an important cognitive tool,  both (he 
primary content and basic activity of thought were conceived perccp; 
tually.  As adopted by  the empiricist tradition, this assumption came 
to mean thL'lt  the elements of thought are  concrete, particulnr ele-
ments in perception. These elements  were regarded as  the medium 
of thought. and hence viewed as requisite in any analysis of cognition 
and knowledge. 
A perspective  in which perceptual data, or perceptually charac-
terized particulars, are the fundamental components of thought and 
cognition need not lead one to neutrrtl  monism,  Russell himself,  in 
the period prior to  1914. had held that sense-data arc the basis of 
knowledge. but had espoused a representational realist view, accord-
ing to which suhjectively experienced sense-data are the means by 
which mind;independent material objects are  known.  But Russell, 
as others before him,  came  to believe that  this position could  eas~ 
ily  lead  to skepticism about the extemal world,  through a "veil of 
perception" problematic.  That is,  if what we know immediately,  as 
regards existent  physical objects,  are the momentary particulars of 
perception;  and  if these momentary particulars present colors and 
perspectivally-ordercd sizes and shapes, whereas external objects are 
thought to consist of comparatively rigid collections of moving par-
ticles  with  a  single,  objective size  and shape,  and physical  colors 
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by  wavelengths of light;  then this situation may seem to pose  an 
insuperable epistemological problem:  How are we  to claim knowl-
edge of the mind-independent world that allegedly causes our per-
ceptions? In the face of  this problem, Russell adopted the view (both 
in the period 1914-18 and after the switch to neutral monism)  that 
the immediately known-the momentary particulars of  perception-
should themselves be regarded as "physical", or as characterizable as 
"physical" under a physical attitude. 
The appeal of neutral monism was  not just to provide a  frame~ 
work for avoiding the veil of  perception problem. I t also helped avoid 
the mind-body problem.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, thinkers such as  Mach, James, and Russell had a healthy 
respect for both mental and physical phenomena.  Mach and James 
acknowledged from the outset two domains of laws:  mental or psy-
chologicallaws, studied in psychology, and physical laws.  For a tep-
resentational realist,  or for  anyone who was  a realist  about minds 
and bodies, this state of affairs could lead to difficulties.  If one was 
a dualist, such as Russell in at least some moods during his interme i 
diate period, the problem was to explain how mind and body inter-
act.  If one was a realist about both physical objects and about men~ 
tal phenomena-the position taken by James in his Principles  (1890, 
ch. 7)-then the problem was  how to account for  the relation be-
tween mental phenomena and the brain. 
Mach's position permitted a way out of this problem.  As devel-
oped by James and Russell, neutral monism avoided the mind-body 
problem by positing only one "stuff", the allegedly neutral "stuff" of 
momentary particulars,  Or  pure  experiences, or Machian elements. 
Mach, James,  and Russell  could  then point to two sets of laws  to 
be found empirically in the successive states of this stuff:  psycho-
logical  laws governing successions of perceptions and  other mental 
states considered as mental, and physical laws governing successions 
of perceptions and posited sensibilia, or unexperienced pure experi-
ences, considered as physical. The mind-body relation then became a 
mattet of  tracing connections between physical sequences and inter-
secting psychological sequences of  mon1entary particulars (as in Rus-
sell,  1921, ch. 15).  The question of  whether all mental events have 
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whether all mental states assigned to an individual can be viewed in 
relation to the processes of  the individual's brain, which processes are 
themselves viewed as constructions based on momentary particulars. 
In the subsequent history of philosophy,  there was  a  tum away 
from the neutral monism of James and Russell.  This was mediated 
partly by  the  failure  to adequately account for  the construction of 
"ordinary"  physical objects  from  montentary  particulars,  a  failure 
brought home through Carnap's  abandoned constructive project in 
the Aufbau  (1928).  The subsequent history  of twentieth-century 
philosophy-including the history oflate twentieth·  century histories 
of early twentieth-century philosophy-saw a  further turning away 
from  the basic  assumptions shared by  Russell,  James,  and others, 
the assumptions ahout the fundamcntaliry of phenomenally charac-
terized perception in thought.  Durnmett (1993)  characterized too 
turn pattly as  a  quest for  a satisfying analysis  of the possibiliry of 
public,  objective knowledge.  In his story,  he cites  the subjectivity 
and  internality of sensation and  perception as  one reason for turn-
ing away from perceptual analyses of thought. He also cites the de-
sire to avoid the alleged fallacy of psychologism, in which the occur-
rent contents of consciousness are taken for thoughts, as another fac-
tor.  A further factor was  the rise of philosophical behaviorism,  with 
its general rejection of mentalistic deSCriptions  (e.g.,  Carnap,  1932; 
Hempen, 1935). When talk of the mental became openly acceptable 
in the 1970s and 1  980s, the conception of  the mental had been trans-
formed.  Informarional content and intentional relation now became 
the paradigms for analyzing mental content generally (as in Dretske, 
1981), and for  (osrensibly)  accounting for  phenomenal cont.ent (as 
in 1\'e,  1995).  These  accounts adopted  a propositional and hence 
language-based account of mental content. The phenomenal, in the 
form of the qualia of perceptual experience, were cast into suspiCion 
as hold-overs from a dualistic past. 
Whether these analyses,  from  Dummett's history to the recent 
systematic theories, can stand as good philosophical analyses of the 
problems and prospects for a theory of perception, and of the role of 
perception in cognition and thought, cannot be decided here. But it 
is appropriate to note a potentially harmful effect of  such positions on 
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phy. The systematic currents mentioned above, from behaviorism to 
infonnation·based theories, exhibit to one degree or  another a fear 
of the mental. In  the heyday of behaviorism, the coherence and le-
gitimacy of any talk of  the mental was challenged.  With the recent 
infonnational accounts, the fear is of the phenomenal.  But the phe-
nomenal aspects of perception were central to the  accounts of per· 
ception, cognition, and thought of  Mach, James, and Russell. To the 
extent that current history adopts the perspective of behaviorism, or 
the less sweeping anti.phenomenalist bias of the informational ac· 
counts, it runs the risk of  discounting a major line of thought in early 
analytic p hilosop  hy. 
Thete are really two dangers here.  The first is  the possibility of 
begging a substantive philosophical question. It  is a substantive ques-
tion whether non-linguistic analyses of  the role of perception in cog-
nition should be rejected.  Those who think they should be rejected 
have no trouble discounting the positions of Mach, James,  and Rus-
sell.  But it remains possible that Mach's theory, as elaborated philo-
sophically by James and Russell, captured an important aspect of  cog-
nition and thought. Or perhaps a new analysis of the role of  phenom-
enally-characterized perceptual states in cognition and thought will 
retain some insights from James and Russell, and reject other parts of 
their theories.  This is a systematic matter,  to be decided by ongoing 
philosophical work. 
The second danger is historiographical.  The flourishing revival 
of work in the history of modem philosophy has been guided in part 
by a contextualist approach ro the work of past philosophers.  This 
approach prescribes that past texts be read in historical context. The 
push toward historical context contrasts with a presentist orientation 
that reads and evaluates past texts as if they might directly contribute 
to present-day philosophical discourse (which of  course they might). 
One of the results of the  contextual approach is  that it treats  past 
positions on their own terms,  instead of attempting to make them 
conform from  the outset to current philosophical tastes.  A conse, 
quence of this approach has been that aspects of past philosophical 
texts that had  seemed unworthy of attention and easy  to  discount 
have come to new prominence in the revised historiography.  Such 
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thors such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant.  Whereas previous gen~ 
erations of scholars ignored Descartes' appeal to intellectual experi~ 
ences occurring independently of the senses, new scholarship  high~ 
lights the importance of Descartes' distinction, which he cast in phe~ 
nomenal terms, between sensory and intellectual cognition (Hatfield, 
2001;  Owen,  1999).  Descartes' phenomenology of the intellect is 
now taken seriously.  Similarly,  Kant's taIk of synthesis was ignored 
by past commentators as an example of  irrelevant psychological mus-
i.ngs injecting themselves in what should have been a purely logical, 
or conceptual, investigation (e.g., Strawson, 1966).  But again, new 
work suggests the value of attending to Kant's own conception of 
what is central to his theory of cognition (e.g., Anderson, 200 I). 
The moral of  this second point, as applied to the present case, is 
that the phenomenalist and perceptual analyses of thought found in 
James and Russell should not be dismissed out of hand, or left out of 
the history of early analytic philosophy. To do so would produce a dis-
torted picture of the major trends in that philosophy, hy making the 
same sort of retrospective adjustment of past theories tha t harmed 
the history of early modern philosophy.  Why should we  care about 
distortion?  Aren't creative misreadings a source of progress?  They 
certainly are. But they are not the only source. The value of  studying 
past philosophical theories does not lie solely, or even mainly, in what 
can be cribbed from them hy way of "new" ideas. Another important 
contribution lies in coming to understand the formation of our cur-
rent conception of  philosophical positions and problems. In seeking 
such understanding, it simply won't do to have our historical per-
spective determined by the bland acceptance of  a local philosophical 
outcome, as if  we  could be sure that the linguistic turn described by 
Dummett (1993) were pennanent. We will be in a better position to 
understand that tum itself, and to assess the legitimacy and grounds 
for restricting the role of the phenomenal in the analysis of mind, if 
we examine for ourselves the major trends in early twentieth~century 
phiIosophy. This means being willing to pursue for that period, as for 
the early moderns, a contextualist account of the conceptions that 
the major figures considered central to their own philosophical work. 
In the case ofJames and Russell, this means taking seriousIy the roIe 
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out the fortunes of neutral monism as a response to skepticism and 
as a solution to the mil\d~body  problem. 
Those who retain a fear of the mental need not worry abou t be-
ing  infected simply  as  a  result of taking seriously the serious con-
sideration of phenomenally-conceived mental states by past philoso-
phers.  For the aim  is not,  in  the first  instance,  to adopt their po. 
sitions outright.  The aim is  rather  to understand their  positions, in 
the course of rethinking the paths that have led to our present philo-
sophical landscape.  Serious  attention to history can both produce 
a  new understanding of the paths taken, and also reveal paths not 
taken. It both cases it allows us to gain distance on the philosophical 
intuitions---often gained uncritically in the course of philosophical 
training-held by ourselves and our contemp::lraries, by understand  .. 
ing the historical process through which they were formed.  In this 
way, serious history of philosophy has been contributing and will con-
tinue to contribute to the advance of philosophy itscl£ 
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1 Among Russell scholars, little attention has been paid to Russell's turn to 
neutral monism.  Hylton (1990,  pp. 330-1, n.  4)  leaves it out of his ac-
eoum.  Some recent lVork  has paid attention to the place of sense·data in 
early twentieth century philosophy, \\i.th mention of RusseU  (Crane, 2000, 
p. 172; Martin, 2000, p. 199). But in these accotll)ts Russen is described as 
a "representative" realist in accordance with Russell (1912), thereby ignor-
ing Russell's own characteristic positions tegarding sense·data and what he 
tenned "momentary particulars", positions he developed in what I call be· 
tow his i.ntermediate periQd (1914-t8) and after hlS tum to neutra[ tnuntsm 
(late in 1918). The American Neo·Realists mentioned above included not 
only James, but also his student Ralph Barton Perry (1912), and the collab~ 
orators in Holt et d. (1912). 
2 Ralph Barton Perry, who saw James' Essays in Radical Empiricism  through 
the press after James' death (in accordance with James' earlier intention to 
pubtish the essays  under that title),  cites evidence that James considered 
his "radical empiricism" to be of greater philosophical import than his prag· 
matism (Perry,  1996, pp. xvi.xvii). RusseU agreed with this ass'eS:>TIlent.  He 
was quite critical of  James' pragmatism, and in any case regarded James as 230  Gary Hatfield. 
one of  three turn~of-.the~century protagonists of  pragmatism (the other two 
being John Dewey and F. C. S. Schiller). But he had strong praise for radical 
empiricism (which he saw as allied with neutral monism), and said that for 
his development of that position alone James would "deserve a high place 
among philosophers" (Russell,  1945, pp. 811-7, quotation from p. 812). 
J Russell noted the similarity between the positiomi of  James and Mach, but 
was unaware of any  reference by James  to Mach on the subject.  Indeed, 
James did not refer to Mach in the papers collected in James (J996).  But 
he had met Mach in Prague during October, 1882, six months prior to the 
completion of Mach (1883).  At that time he heard a physics lecture by 
Mach, and spent roUt  hours conversing with him (James,  i9Z0,  t: IH-I). 
In James (1890) he referred several times to Mach (1886). 